Abstract—Medical devices are increasingly being developed not as standalone units but as network-aware machines that can be integrated via high-assurance middleware and coordinated with software into clinically useful applications for Medical Application Platforms (MAP apps). While this concept is still emerging, both regulators and vendors recognize that these apps can be as powerful as purpose-built medical devices, and they are struggling to understand the appropriate techniques to support risk assessment and safety claims. Before being approved for market, the reliability of medical devices is typically ascertained by performing one of a number of hardware-centric, reliability-focused analyses. However, these techniques are not a good fit for the combined hardware and software systems that are defined by MAP apps, nor is their emphasis on reliability appropriate when the end goal is safety.

In this work, we tailor a modern, systems-based hazard analysis technique (STAMP / STPA) to the domain of MAP apps by leveraging our prior work in safety-critical systems engineering for medical software. We also build on our previously developed AADL-based language and tooling for the semi-formal modeling of MAP app architectures to provide a proof-of-concept tool that aids the transition between design and analysis. This tool takes as input an architectural model annotated with both new and re-purposed constructs from AADL (as well as its error modeling annex) and produces as output a report in our proposed format. We ground our approach by using a clinically-sourced scenario that serves as a motivating example: we provide an annotated architectural model and hazard analysis report that serve as exemplars of our technique and tooling.

I. INTRODUCTION

Medical device manufacturers, which have long developed their products as standalone units, are now beginning to develop devices capable of interacting with each other over a network. These interactions, which range from simple information-forwarding applications to sophisticated closed-loop medical systems, have attracted increasing regulatory attention on a global basis. The resulting research has focused on a number of aspects of these “systems of systems” as well as the software platforms that enable them (term medical application platforms, or MAPs[1]): the devices themselves, the software that governs their interactions (apps), as well as the underlying network infrastructure upon which the systems are composed. Additionally, there is an increasing understanding that the application of traditional system safety analysis techniques to the apps that run on these platforms is at best awkward and at times wholly inappropriate.

Consider, for example, the “PCA Interlock” scenario described in Figure 1, which details a situation where a patient died due to the lack of interaction between her physiological monitors and her patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) pump. Had the monitors, typically a pulse oximeter (which tracks blood-oxygen saturation (SpO₂) and pulse rate) and a capnograph (which monitors exhaled CO₂ (EtCO₂) and respiratory rate) been able to command the PCA pump to run at a minimal rate (i.e., form an interlock) via straightforward application logic, the patient’s life may have been saved. Though this application logic would not be difficult to develop, making a strong argument about the resulting system’s safety would be. Integrating the outputs of numerous devices, each of which can fail in a number of ways, to control a PCA pump which is itself fallible requires sophisticated error handling procedures. Since failure could mean serious injury or loss of life, a strong argument for safety must be made before the system is deployed.

There exists work, by both regulators and researchers, on the architectural aspects of MAPs. ASTM International has developed their F2761-09 standard, which describes the functional architecture for an “Integrated Clinical Environment” (ICE) [3]. There have also been proposals for a MAP-specific architecture description language based on the Society of Automotive Engineer’s (SAE’s) Architecture Analysis and Description Language (AADL) [4]. What has not yet been addressed, though, is how best to argue for the safety of MAP apps. While some standards exist that address safety and risk management for medical devices and medical device software, (e.g., ISO 14971 and IEC 60601) most were written before the concepts of MAP apps and ICE were well known and may not be well-suited to the domain.

What is needed, then, is a proposal for a hazard analy-
sis technique that is germane to MAP apps. Fortunately, a considerable amount of work in this area has already been done—a large number of hazard analyses (see, e.g., [5]) have been developed and refined over the years, and many are recommended (if not required) by medical device safety standards. However, since the field of hazard analysis continues to evolve (see, e.g., the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) and its associated hazard analysis technique, System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [6]), the issue of the most appropriate hazard analysis technique for MAP apps merits discussion. Further, many of the criticisms of existing hazard analyses such as informal (i.e., “word file”) formatting, manual construction, and a lack of integration with development artifacts [7] are especially problematic in the domain of MAP apps, as many of them tend to be relatively small, simple programs whose value lies partially in a quick time to market.

In light of these issues, we present in this paper a description of work which integrates cutting-edge hazard-documentation technologies with a similarly modern hazard analysis technique. Specifically, we describe the following contributions in this work:

1) A proposed format for MAP app hazard analysis which is based on the STAMP causality model and refined by our experience in the domain, and
2) An encoding of the information required by the report format from 1) using both AADL's error-modeling (EMV2) annex and the AADL subset described in [4], and
3) An implementation of an automated translator that takes as input the EMV2 and AADL annotations from 2) and produces the report described in 1), and
4) A hazard analysis of the PCA Interlock MAP app, documented in the format described in 2) (which serves as expected input to our translator) and in the format described in 1) (which serves as expected output).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the background of regulations and technologies relevant to this work. Section III explains our vision for a regulatory regime suited to MAP apps. Section IV describes our proposed STAMP-based report format. Section V describes our proposed use of EMV2 and the AADL subset from [4] as well as the tool which converts these annotations to our report format. In Section VI we conclude and discuss future work.

II. BACKGROUND

Like many interdisciplinary projects, our work is both informed and constrained by a number of different technologies. Some of these, like AADL, are quite close to core computer science topics (e.g., model-driven development) while others, like hazard analysis and the regulatory infrastructure, are external to the field. Though this can add an initial barrier to working in the domain [8], understanding the entire MAP ecosystem is vital to making an impact in the real world.

A. Regulatory Authorities

Hatcliff et al. explain that “…society’s confidence in safety-critical systems is typically established by government regulation, including requirements for licensing and certification” [8]. Relevant regulations include United States 21 C.F.R. §820.30(g) et seq. which specifies that “Each [medical device] manufacturer shall establish and maintain procedures for validating the device design. Design validation shall... include software validation and risk analysis, where appropriate.” Similarly, in the European Union, Council Directive 93/42/EEC Concerning Medical Devices states that “The manufacturer must lodge an application for assessment [which] must include... the design specifications, including the standards which will be applied and the results of the risk analysis.”

The question then is, how is “risk analysis” evaluated? For the purpose of these regulations, typically a “mark” (e.g., CEF) must be earned through the application of a relevant standard. For work in the medical device domain, this often means adherence to ISO 14971, which describes risk management for medical devices. When applied to software, application of ISO 14971 can be guided by the non-normative IEC 80001. There are a number of other relevant standards (e.g., IEC 62304: Medical device software – Software life cycle processes, IEC 60601: Medical electrical equipment, etc.) as well as emerging standards (e.g., AAMI/UL 2800: Interoperable Medical Device Interface Safety).

Hatcliff et al. note later in [8] that “The presence of so many standards... can be bewildering to anybody operating in [the safety critical] domain, and can be a significant barrier in the education of new practitioners and researchers.” Indeed, we hope that our more formal, tool-supported efforts in this area can guide future revisions of related standards towards a more practicable approach.

B. Hazard Analysis Techniques

Many of the previously mentioned risk-management standards are hazard analysis techniques. A number of broadly-applicable techniques have been developed and used successfully in range of safety-critical engineering domains. Two of the most common are Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA); a less common third technique, STAMP/STPA, has been developed more recently.

1) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis: Originally developed in 1949 by the U.S. military, FMEA is a bottom-up analysis that considers the individual components (i.e. the hardware, software, or “functional” elements of a system) of a system and analyzes how they could fail [5]. Depending on the type of component under analysis, different failure mode keywords are suggested (e.g., for software components Ericson lists examples like “unsent messages” or “software hangs”) though practitioners will likely also want to introduce domain-specific failure modes as well. Table I shows an excerpted example of what an FMEA might look like for the PCA Interlock scenario, based on the format provided in [5]. It examines what might happen if the pulse oximeter fails to provide accurate SpO₂ data to the application logic for various reasons. A full analysis would cover all required functionality for the scenario’s various subsystems (e.g., devices and application logic). Note that FMEA is primarily a reliability analysis that typically focuses on failures with a single cause, and it relies on experientially

As explained in [8], it is a common misconception that safety and reliability are synonymous. Reliability’s definition can be paraphrased as “ability to perform required functions” while safety is “freedom from harm.”
TABLE I. EXCERPTS FROM AN EXAMPLE FMEA WORKSHEET FOR THE PCA INTERLOCK APP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Failure Mode</th>
<th>Fail Rate</th>
<th>Causal Factors</th>
<th>Immediate Effect</th>
<th>System Effect</th>
<th>Method of Detection</th>
<th>Current Controls</th>
<th>Hazard</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Recommended Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SpO₂</td>
<td>Fails to provide</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Network failure, device failure</td>
<td>SpO₂ not reported</td>
<td>Unknown patient state</td>
<td>App</td>
<td>Potential for overdose</td>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Default to KVO command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides late</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Network congestion, transient device failure</td>
<td>SpO₂ not reported</td>
<td>Unknown patient state</td>
<td>App</td>
<td>Potential for overdose</td>
<td>3C</td>
<td>Default to KVO command until new data arrive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides wrong</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Device error</td>
<td>SpO₂ value incorrect</td>
<td>Incorrect patient state</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Potential for overdose</td>
<td>1E</td>
<td>Have device report data quality with sensor reading</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Fig 2. An excerpt of an example fault tree

Fig 3. An example control loop annotated according to STPA

derived (typically published in aggregate) failure rates [9] that may not be available—or even appropriate—for purpose-built software components.

2) Fault Tree Analysis: Fault Tree Analysis is a top-down analysis technique that begins with a definition of an undesired event and then has the analyst consider what contributory faults could cause that event [5]. Unlike FMEA, FTA is a graphical analysis where faults are joined together (enabling the consideration of multiply-sourced failures) using logic gates (e.g., AND and OR) and can be repeated iteratively until a desired level of depth / rigor has been achieved. An excerpt of an example FTA for the PCA interlock scenario is shown in Figure 2. The top event corresponds to what should be avoided, and both of the contributory events (joined by AND-gate G1) must happen for the top-level event to occur. Only one of the contributory events joined by G2 would be necessary, though, as it is an OR-gate. A full FTA would likely trace down farther (i.e., it would include more levels of contributory events) and include a number of trees—one corresponding to each event or system state to be avoided.

3) STAMP / STPA: After examining a number of failings with safety-critical systems (and the engineering processes that guided their designs) Leveson recently (2011) described the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) causality model and an associated hazard analysis, System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [6]. As their names imply, STAMP and STPA differ most significantly from previous hazard analyses in their use of systems theory, which is defined by Leveson as an approach that “focuses on systems taken as a whole, not on the parts taken separately.” Unlike FMEA, which has component failures as its central notion, or FTA, which focuses on avoidance of certain events, STPA is driven by the avoidance of unsafe control actions (i.e., actions that can affect the state of the system).

Once a list of unsafe control actions has been identified, potential causes can be analyzed and prevented / mitigated. A complete list of control actions can be automatically created given a thorough architectural description—reducing the hazard analysis expertise required and streamlining the development process. STPA contextualizes control actions by placing them in control loops, which by definition contain one or more a) actuators, b) sensors, c) controllers, and d) controlled processes. Figure 3 shows an excerpt of an annotated control loop for the PCA interlock scenario. Each element and link between elements is annotated with potentially unsafe actions; note the associated guide-phrases in italics.

C. AADL

The Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) is a model-based architecture description language developed in 2004 by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) [10]. It enables a developer to completely model a system’s architecture—from the software that performs the required functionality, to the hardware that the software runs on, as...
well as the binding from the latter to the former. It is supported by a number of tools, including the open-source OSATE2, a powerful, Eclipse-based IDE, and has previously been used to describe and analyse medical device architectures [11], [12], [13]. In our previous work we have examined AADL’s applicability to MAP apps and identified a usable subset [4].

One reason that AADL is a particularly attractive language for describing safety-critical systems is because it has a number of language annexes that extend its modeling power to certain non-architectural system aspects. One such extension is the error modeling annex (in its second version, abbreviated EMV2) [14]. The error modeling annex, which is based on Wallace’s fault propagation and transformation language and algorithm [15], enables a developer to model error types, sources, propagations, behavior, detections, etc. Larson et al. have previously examined the application of EMV2 to a safety-critical medical device, and found that it enabled the realization of a number of benefits, including a) formal, machine-readable inputs, b) tight integration with the architectural model, and c) automated construction of FTA and FMEA-like reports [7].

III. VISION

The hazard analysis work here is a component of the larger app development environment (ADE) vision outlined in [4]. That vision lays out our plans for creating an ADE which supports all aspects of MAP-app development—including the creation of architectural, behavioral, hazard analysis, and safety-argumentation artifacts which will aid in the app’s regulatory approval process.

A. Apps as System Integrators

In traditional safety-critical development, a system’s various components are integrated by a systems expert before deployment. The MAP vision is unique, though, because while a MAP app’s functionality is safety-critical (that is, people may die as a result of errors), the system integration is specified by the app developer and the assembly is done at the time of app launch. That is, the app itself defines the system schematically by its set of assumptions and constraints. At app launch, the platform guarantees that an instantiation of this app meets these constraints. MAP apps specify the components (both software and hardware) used, as well as how those components are connected and any real-time or quality-of-service settings that are required for safety.

This compositional style of construction requires a correspondingly compositional safety argument—if regulators were to only certify apps as safe when instantiated in certain exact configurations (i.e., with specific devices as opposed to types of devices), it would greatly limit the usefulness and impact of the MAP vision. Compositional hazard analysis is a complex problem, though, and one that has only recently begun to be addressed (see, e.g., [15]). We will address the full compositional safety vision elsewhere; in this paper we focus on hazard analysis activities that would be carried out within the app boundary.

B. Envisioned Regulatory Regime

We believe that arguments for an app’s safety should come from first principles, but we recognize that a full system analysis—involving not only the app’s software components but also the medical devices, composed system, and clinical process in which it would be used—is likely too high of a safety burden for app authors. Instead, we believe that most apps will be certified as members of app families (as in, AAMI/UL 2800, which addresses safety issues with the PCA interlock scenario) which will have notions of safety determined by standardization bodies. An app family would include things like devices and hardware components used, system-level hazards and safety constraints (to which app-level hazards and safety constraints would be traced), as well as the intended use of the app.

IV. STPA REPORT FORMAT

In Engineering a Safer World, Leveson presents a flexible, broadly-applicable hazard analysis that is suited to a range of safety-critical systems [6]. This original presentation is not tailored to any specific category of system, but since we know the various properties and architectural constraints of MAPs, we believe that the technique can be specialized somewhat to the domain. In particular, we believe that the somewhat prescriptive format presented here will provide guidance to analysts, and produce a more uniform final product.

In this section we present a walkthrough of a proposed report format2 and associated process which apply both STPA and a number of lessons we have learned to the PCA interlock scenario. As discussed earlier, we will confine ourselves to notions of harm that are contributed to by the app itself. At a high level, the STPA-based report format we have developed is divided into three sections: a background, STPA fundamentals, and unsafe control actions and their causes (see Figure 4).

A. Background

Though not mentioned in [6], we believe that before any actual hazard analysis is performed, it is important to contextualize the effort. This can be done with a brief narrative that introduces the scenario and explains the clinical need,
System Accident Levels
1) \( L1 \): A human is killed or seriously injured

System Accidents
1) \( A1 \): Patient is killed or seriously injured \([L1]\)

App-Contributed Hazards
1) \( H1 \): Commands for dosage exceeding the patient’s tolerance are sent to the pump \([A1]\)
\( \iff \) \( SH1 \): The pump administers more drug than the patient can safely tolerate. \([A1]\)
2) \( H2 \): Incorrect information is sent to the display \([A1]\)
\( \iff \) \( SH2 \): The clinician is misinformed of the patient’s health status. \([A1]\)

App Safety Constraints
1) \( C1 \): The app must command the pump to stop if the patient’s vital signs indicate over-infusion. \([H1]\)
\( \iff \) \( SC1 \): The pump must not administer more drug than the patient can safely tolerate. \([H1]\)
2) \( C2 \): The app must inform the display of the status of the patient’s vital signs. \([H2]\)
\( \iff \) \( SC2 \): The clinician must be informed of the patient’s status. \([H2]\)
3) \( C3 \): The app must inform the display of the pump command status. \([H2]\)
\( \iff \) \( SC3 \): The clinician must be informed of the pump command status. \([H2]\)

B. Fundamentals

After the background, a number of basic concepts need to be established before diving into hazard analysis. In her work, Leveson refers to these as fundamentals\(^3\) (see page 181 of [6]); in this paper we provide a set of examples tailored to the MAP domain. Specifically, our derivative, prescriptive format for report fundamentals is composed of: a) accident levels, b) accidents, c) system boundaries, d) hazards\(^4\), e) safety constraints, f) control actions, and g) the control structure [6].

On page 181 of [6], Leveson explains that “[t]he first step in any safety effort involves agreeing on the types of accidents or losses to be considered.” Figure 5 shows some fundamentals for the PCA interlock scenario, including both accidents and accident levels. Our one accident level is the loss of human life (other apps may need to consider things like, e.g., damage to equipment) and we have only one way that humans could be harmed: if the pump administers too much drug (A1). How our app could cause this, though, depends on where we draw the app and system boundaries.

Figure 6 shows the three boundaries present in the PCA interlock scenario. The outermost process boundary includes all scenario components, actors, as well as the clinical environment. The middle system boundary includes the system as defined by our app developer—all the devices and software components. The innermost app boundary includes only the messages sent to and from the software components developed by our app author.

Once these boundaries have been established, Leveson says that the next step is to start identifying hazards, which she defines as “[a]... set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss).”\(^5\) We find that our app can cause accident A1 either by failing to stop the pump (H1 in Figure 5) or by misinforming the clinician of the patient or app status (H2). In order to prevent these hazards, we then establish safety constraints, which Leveson describes (on page 191 of [6]) as “… design constraints necessary to prevent the hazards from occurring.” Note that while accidents and accident levels are shared between a system and its components, the app will have its own hazards and safety constraints. These should be traced to their system-level source—shown in Figure 5 by the \( \rightarrow \) symbol.

After the safety constraints have been identified, we are ready to identify the control actions and place them into the control structure as in Figure 7. Control actions are all the inputs and outputs of the system’s components, and typically include information on their range of possible values. For simple binary actions (e.g., “pump normal”*/pump KVO”) the values can be enumerated; for non-binary actions (denoted by a * in Figure 7), a range of inputs should be defined: e.g., 0% < SpO\(_2\) < 100%. Once the control actions have been defined, the analyst should use them as labels on the communication links between system components. Next, the process model of the app should be broken down into its component variables,

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\(^3\) Note that Leveson’s definitions of these terms differ somewhat from standardized definitions used by medical risk-management standards. (e.g., those in ISO 14971). We use her definitions in this paper.

\(^4\) In the style of IEC 80001, we do not consider certain classes of hazards, e.g., electric shock. We assume that all devices used by our apps are IEC 60601 compliant, i.e., we only will be reasoning about newly-created hazards.
which themselves should be discretized into meaningful states like “too high” or “no error.” The control actions and process model combine to give a high-level overview of the inputs and outputs to each component.

C. Identifying Unsafe Control Actions

Now that the control actions are documented, we can begin determining which of them could be provided in potentially unsafe ways, examples of which are shown in Tables II and III. Leveson notes that this is where STPA actually begins, and explains that it has two steps: first, the identification of which control actions could be provided in unsafe ways; and second, a determination of how these actions could be provided in unsafe ways.

The first step—finding control actions that could be provided in unsafe ways—is done by simply examining each control action individually and reasoning about whether or not it could be performed in an unsafe way. This reasoning is driven by a number of guidewords that Leveson provides (see page 218 of [6]), e.g., “Not Providing Causes Hazard,” which guides the analyst to consider the case where the control action is not provided even though it should be. The results are then compiled into a table, an excerpt of which is given in Table II. Consider the first row of this table, which looks at the control action individually and reasoning about whether or not it could be performed in an unsafe way. If this command is provided at an incorrect time (e.g., when the patient is experiencing respiratory depression) it could lead to an overdose and the patient’s death—hazard H1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Action: PulseOx → App: Provide SpO₂</th>
<th>Value High</th>
<th>Value Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too Long or Too Short:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wrong values:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cause: Incorrect values are gathered from the physiological sensors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Compensation: ??</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not Providing: Not hazardous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wrong Timing or Order: Not applicable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Too Long or Too Short:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Too Long: Network Drop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cause: Network drops out, leaving the pump running normally regardless of the patient’s health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Compensation: Commands to pump normally have an associated maximum time, after which the pump returns to KVO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Specifying Causes and Compensations

Once hazardous control actions have been identified, it is time to consider how these actions could occur; some examples are shown in our proposed format in Figure 8. Here Leveson again provides a number of guidewords (e.g., “inadequate control algorithm,” or “control input... wrong or missing;” see page 223 of [6]) that are helpful, as is experience building similar systems. We differ slightly from Leveson’s documentation strategy here, as her examples use causes as annotations on a diagram of the control loop, as in Figure 3. We believe that while this is a reasonable documentation strategy, it would also suffice to use a simple list (as in Figure 8), as graphical layouts can be difficult to read with large numbers of causes, and do not have space for compensatory actions.

Note that some hazards can be “designed-out,” i.e., rendered impossible through clever design as in the final “Too Long: Network Drop” section of Figure 8. In this case, the pump normally command is applied longer than it should be—that is, even after the patient shows signs of respiratory depression—because the network becomes unavailable while the pump is running at the normal rate. In this situation, the
command to run at the KVO rate would never arrive at the pump. If a ticket-based approach were used instead (described in detail in [17]), where a ticket with a timeout is given to the pump (e.g., "pump normally for six minutes"), it would be impossible for a network drop to lead to an overdose as the pump would simply return to the KVO rate after a set period of time. Other hazards, though, cannot be compensated for by the app—e.g., when undetectably wrong (i.e., incorrect but in-range) values are received from physiological monitors—these faults will be propagated to other system components.

V. EMV2 Annotations

We have previously written about the subset of AADL we created to enable semi-formal descriptions of MAP app architectures and how these descriptions can be leveraged for code generation [4]. It seems natural to also evaluate additional capabilities of the language in light of other (i.e., non-architectural) desirable app design criteria. Chief among these is the desire for error modeling capabilities, particularly if those capabilities can be made to align with the STPA report format discussed in Section IV. Without this alignment, hazard analysis will remain an informal activity and the created artifacts will not be integrated with the app architecture.

The use of EMV2—which enables developers to specify error causes, effects, and propagations in an AADL model—for MAP apps would bring a number of benefits, both those discussed in [7] (e.g., machine-readable inputs, close integration with the architectural model, automated report generation) and some degree of compositional interface; since errors can be declared to propagate between components, we would move closer to the compositional vision described in Section III. That said, there are also disadvantages to applying the EMV2 language annex directly, primarily that EMV2 is designed for 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Action</th>
<th>Providing</th>
<th>Not Providing</th>
<th>Wrong Timing or Order</th>
<th>Too Long or Too Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>App → Pump: Command Normal</td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Not Hazardous</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Too Long: H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>App → Pump: Command KVO</td>
<td>H1</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Too Long: H1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>App → Disp: Command Normal</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Too Long, Too Short: H2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>App → Disp: Command KVO</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>H2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Too Long, Too Short: H2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dev → App: Physio Data | Not Hazardous | H1, H2 | Late: H1, H2 | Too Short: H1, H2 |

TABLE II. EXCERPT OF POTENTIALLY UNSAFE CONTROL ACTIONS

Fig. 9. Definitions of STPA fundamentals as AADL properties

Fig. 10. Uses of STPA fundamental properties in AADL

A. Annotation Walkthrough

The process for annotating an architectural model is an iterative one, and one that is aided by tooling. We have developed our examples in OSATE2 as it provides rich support for modeling errors with EMV2.

1) Modeling Background and Fundamentals: Recall from Section IV-B that there are seven components of STPA’s “fundamentals,” ranging from accidents (and their associated severity levels) through the control structure of the system under review. Four of the first five fundamentals (accident levels, accidents, hazards and safety constraints) are essentially informal, plain-language statements that are organized in a hierarchical tree. We implemented these components using AADL’s built-in, extensible property notation. The result is a straightforward set of properties that can be quickly navigated using an AADL development tool like OSATE2 [11]. Elements of the background—context, abbreviations and assumptions—were also modeled as basic AADL properties, although their relations to one another form no particular structure.

An excerpt of the property definitions we have created is
Fig. 11. An excerpt of an AADL System Implementation component annotated with an EMV2 connection error and occurrence property shown in Figure 9, and some example uses (corresponding to Figure 5) are presented in Figure 10. Lines 12-15 of Figure 9 specify the information required to define a hazard: a unique identifier (line 13), a human-readable description (line 14), and the accident that the hazard is associated with (line 15). Two uses of this definition are shown in lines 12-22 of Figure 10.

2) Generating the set of Control Actions: Since an app’s control actions are architectural constructs, they do not need to be specified as part of a hazard analysis. Rather, it is a straightforward process to identify an app’s control actions from an architectural model specified in the language from [4]. The control actions are equivalent to connections between components, as these specify the type, direction, and name of the control action. Unfortunately, the graphical nature of the system boundary and process model components of the report format from Section IV make auto-generation of these difficult, and for the time being, these must be created manually. Once created, they will be coupled with the automatically generated list of action behaviors and be included in the report generated by our translator.

3) Modeling Hazardous Control Actions and their Causes: Beginning with the first key realization discussed above (that port connections are equivalent to control actions), a natural starting point for documenting a STAMP-based hazard analysis is the EMV2 connection error construct, which enables a developer to specify a named error that can occur on a specific port connection. Once our potentially hazardous control action has been defined, we need to do three things: a) link it to the “fundamental” elements we have previously defined (e.g., accidents, hazards, constraints, etc.), b) define how it could occur, and c) specify the impact of the occurrence, i.e., how it will affect the system itself.

All of these tasks are accomplished using a new property we have created, termed “occurrence,” an example of which is shown in Figure 9, and some example uses (corresponding to Figure 5) are presented in Figure 10. Lines 12-15 of Figure 9 specify the information required to define a hazard: a unique identifier (line 13), a human-readable description (line 14), and the accident that the hazard is associated with (line 15). Two uses of this definition are shown in lines 12-22 of Figure 10.

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B. Integration with AADL EMV2

The “impact” component of the occurrence property (line 20 of Figure 11) contains a reference to an EMV2 error type. EMV2 error types inherit from a carefully constructed error type hierarchy [7], and as part of this work, we have defined a number of domain specific error types that we believe will be useful to MAP app developers (see Table IV). We expect that developers may want to extend or rename these types into app-specific errors. For example, the error type CmdOD on line 20 of Figure 11 extends from the MAP Error Type AppCommission on the level of the EMV2 standard error library type ServiceOmission.

Once created as part of an occurrence property definition, EMV2 error types should be fully traced through the system from their generative source, through any transformations, to their sink (shown graphically in Figure 12). While error type definitions are typically written in a separate file, their propagations must be attached to individual, affected components. These propagations follow a predictable pattern of first declaring a propagation direction (e.g., in or out) and then realizing the propagation with an error flow component (e.g., a source, transformation, or sink). For example, the SpO2ValueHigh error could occur in the pulse oximeter’s interface (box 1 in Figure 12) as an out propagation realized by a flow source. Error transformations, as their name implies, represent the conversion of one error type into another, as in box 3 of Figure 12. Note that in addition to the transformative flow specification there are two propagations:
SpO2HighFlowsSource:
  SpO2High:
    source: error source SpO2
    and propagations:
      error propagations
        SpO2: out propagation (SpO2High)
        flows
        SpO2HighFlowSource: error source SpO2
        end connection;

Controller: App Logic

Wrong SpO2 Value sent to App Logic

Wrong SpO2 ValueHigh error

conclusion error
  spo2_high_err: error source spo2_logic
  and connection:
    properties
      MAP_Errors: occurrence => [Kind => spo2_high]
      Has => PCA_Error_Props;
      Constraints => PCA_Error_Props;
      Description => "Wrong values!"
      Cause => "Incorrect values are received from the physiological sensors."
      Impact => reference(spo2High);
    [ ] applies to spo2_high_err;

Control Action: App => PCA Pump

Shutoff command is not sent

conclusion error
  cmd_od_err: error source pumpcmd_logic
  and connection:
    properties
      MAP_Errors: occurrence => [Kind => pumpcmd_output]
      Has => PCA_Error_Props;
      Constraints => PCA_Error_Props;
      Description => "No shutoff command"
      Cause => "App should command pump to shutoff, but it doesn’t!"
      Compensation => "???"
      Impact => reference(cmdOD);
    [ ] applies to cmd_od_err;

Fig. 12. A control loop annotated with a complete error trace

the consumption of the original error type (SpO2ValueHigh) and
the production of the new error type (CmdOD). Finally, error
sinks (box 5) have an in propagation with a corresponding
sink flow.

C. Putting it All Together

The connection between a model’s architecture and the
potentialities for unsafe control actions identified by STPA
is formed via the “impact” sub-property (line 20 of Figure
11). More specifically, the impact of an occurrence must be
an error type that is propagated between the twoAADL con-
structs joined by the port connection that the occurrence
property is applied to. Box 1 of Figure 12, the pulse oximeter,
contains an EMV2 error source: it declares its SpO2 port to
be a source of the SpO2High error; i.e., it is possible for
its sensor to read incorrectly high SpO2 data from the patient.
Box 2 is an occurrence property that documents this error, and
links it to previously created hazards and constraints; it has
SpO2High as its impact. Box 3, the app logic, declares the
previously discussed error transformation. Box 4 is another
example of an occurrence property; note that the “impact”
component now references CmdOD—if this occurrence comes
to pass, the result will be the app failing to shut down the
pump even though the patient is showing signs of respiratory
depression. Finally, box 5 is the PCA pump declaring an error
sink for the CmdOD error, it is the final stopping point for this
error chain.

We believe that the feedback that OSATE2 provides when
using these EMV2 annotations is an invaluable component
of the hazard-documentation process. As unhandled incoming
error propagations are recognized statically and highlighted
in a similar fashion to syntax errors, it is our experience that
developers will create an error type as the impact of
one hazard, but upon considering the effects of that error’s
propagation to other—thought to be uninvolved—components
discover additional hazards. This iterative interaction between
the top-down, control-action focused STPA and the bottom-up,
component-failure driven EMV2 drives the analysis forward.

D. Report Generation

Using as a base both OSATE2’s EMV2 support and the
MAP app targeted subset of AADL and associated tooling
described in [4], we have implemented a translator which takes
as input an architectural model with the annotations described
here and produces a report in the format described in Section
IV. This translator is open-source, and is available as a plugin
to OSATE26.

E. Comparison with Prior Approaches

We believe that our proposed report format, when generated
from the annotations discussed in this section, represents an
advancement of the state of the art for hazard analysis of MAP
apps. We now briefly compare to the previously discussed
hazard analyses.

1) Versus FMEA: Though FMEA has been in use for
some time and has positive aspects, like its keyword-based
guidance for analysts, there are a number of known problems
with it. Ericson cites several, including a “[focus] on single
failure modes rather than failure mode combinations” and a
“[requirement of] expertise on the product or process under
analysis” [5]. Additionally, at least one study has performed
an in-depth gap analysis between a STAMP-based hazard analysis
and one based on FMEA, and found that when analyzing
a system the STAMP-based analysis identified more hazards
(175 vs 70) including those that were “complex and non-
linear” yet still consumed “[considerably] less time and [fewer]
resources” [21].

2) Versus FTA: While FTA avoids many of the problems
that affect FMEA, we believe our proposal still has some
key advantages. One of the largest advantages comes from
the keyword-based approach that the STAMP causality model
advocates (and that we have encoded in our annotation defini-
tions). We believe that these keywords, combined with the list
of control actions that a developer gets “for free” by simply
developing her architectural model in the supported AADL
subset, will provide a straightforward set of potential faults
that can be iterated over. In an FTA, however, analysts are given
considerably less guidance. Events to be avoided are placed at
the top level of fault trees and it is up to the analyst’s system
understanding—and to some extent creativity—to determine
the myriad ways that the failures can occur.

VI. CONCLUSION

Our objective for this work, as described in Section I, was
to a) describe a hazard analysis report format that would be
both germane to MAP apps and based on the STAMP causality
model, b) describe annotations in AADL’s EMV2 annex that
would enable the encoding of the information required by the
report, c) document a tool that will generate the report, and
d) use as a motivating example the PCA interlock scenario. We
believe our effort was, on the whole, successful.

6http://santoslab.org/pub/mcdf-architect
A. Lessons Learned

Perhaps the most pleasantly surprising result was how well the top-down approach of STPA and the bottom-up approach of EMV2 / FMEA can work together to iteratively drive not only the hazard analysis but the system design itself forward. The need for, and benefits of, this iteration are discussed in [6], and we believe our work in this area realizes and appropriately specializes Leveson’s work to the MAP app domain.

With this work, our previous work [4] on semi-formal architectural specifications of MAP apps has begun to bear fruit. We believed that, in addition to the immediately realizable benefits like code generation and automatic interface conformance checking, there would be additional reason to define an app’s architecture in a subset of AADL. The ease with which some tasks in this work were accomplished, e.g., the identification of an app’s control actions, is validation of those beliefs. Additionally, some of what we learned reinforces the findings from [8], specifically that tooling and automation are vital to the development of safety-critical, software-dependent systems.

That said, there were some problems encountered. Support for AADL’s EMV2 annex—as well as the language itself—is not yet mature; not only did we, in the course of developing our tool, have to submit a patch to the OSATE2 developers, but the annotation style can at times be awkward. Additionally, our report format currently relies on a number of graphical system layouts which we cannot automatically generate. This may impede the adoption of our report format and tooling.

B. Future Work

Our next steps in this area will be to both inform and be informed by ongoing standardization and regulatory efforts. Though we believe our work can bring considerable safety-critical software expertise to such groups, we are very much reliant on them for clinical experience and feedback. Additionally, it is through our efforts with these organizations that we expect to see the largest and most tangible results of this work.

We also plan on examining other techniques previously used in system safety attestation, e.g., the construction of safety assurance cases. The role of these techniques in future standards, research, and above all industry will largely be determined by how successful we (as a community) are at applying existing software engineering knowledge in the form of tool-supported processes for the development of safety-critical, software-based systems.

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